Bertrand colludes more than Cournot
Experimental EconomicsPublished 2 February 2007Open access
Sigrid Suetens, Jan Potters
Citations70
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score2.09
SNIP1.55
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Abstract
Abstract On the basis of evidence of past oligopoly experiments, we argue that there is often significantly more tacit collusion in Bertrand price-choice than in Cournot quantity-choice markets.
Keywords
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
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