Measurement of social power, opportunity costs, and the theory of two-person bargaining games

A has power over B to the extent to which he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do, that is, in terms of the changes that A causes or can cause in Bs behavior.

Abstract

Several authors have recently suggested measuring social power in terms of its effects; that is, in terms of the changes that A can cause in B's behavior. This paper argues that an adequate measure of power must also contain information on the two parties' opportunity costs—the costs to A of acquiring or using his power over B, which the paper calls the costs of A's power; and the costs to B of noncompliance, which measure the strength of B's incentives to compliance, and which the paper calls the strength of A's power over B. For bilateral power situations, where both parties can exert pressure on each other, a somewhat different game-theoretical measure for the strength of A's power is developed.