The Difficulty of the Linda Conjunction Problem Can Be Attributed to Its Simultaneous Concrete and Unnatural Representation, and Not to Conversational Implicature

Abstract

To determine whether the high rate of conjunction errors (CEs) to the notorious Linda problem can be explained by the violation of implicit conversational rules, rather than by its concrete-unnatural representation, as proposed by cognitive-experiential self-theory, participants were given completely disclosing information. Although this procedure, directed toward a rational mode of information processing, reduced CEs, a majority of participants continued to make CEs. A graded series of problems designed to activate latent, intuitive knowledge, but not a procedure designed to provide additional information of a rational nature, additionally reduced CEs. The implications of the findings are discussed with respect to two independent, parallel modes of information processing: experiential-intuitive and rational-analytic. In certain situations the outcome of the experiential-intuitive mode is more compelling than that of the rational-analytical mode, even when the latter is equally accessible. Our findings indicate that the resistance of the Linda problem to a probabilistic solution is even greater than previously suspected.