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The Strategic Bequest Motive

Journal of Labor EconomicsPublished 1 July 1986
B. Douglas Bernheim, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers
Citations1,182
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score6.40
SNIP2.95

Abstract

Although recent research suggests that intergenerational transfers play an important role in aggregate capital accumulation, our understanding of bequest motives remains incomplete. We develop a simple model of strategic bequests in which a testator influences the decisions of his beneficiaries by holding wealth in bequeathable forms and by conditioning the division of bequests on the beneficiaries' actions. The model generates falsifiable empirical predictions that are inconsistent with other theories of intergenerational transfers. We present econometric and other evidence that strongly suggests that bequests are often used as compensation for services rendered by beneficiaries.

Keywords

Social SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and FinanceBusiness, Management and Accounting