Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism" \n
CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology)Published 1 January 2003
Colin F. Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue, Matthew Rabin
Citations1,118
Generate an AI Snapshot to get a quick, structured summary of this paper.
Study Snapshot
ObjectiveStudy objective
MethodsResearch methodology
PopulationPopulation studied
Sample sizeSample sizes
OutcomesStudy outcomes here
ResultsStudy results comes here
LimitationsResearch study limitations comes here
A concise AI-generated summary of the paper will appear here once you click Generate AI Snapshot.
Abstract
Regulation by the state can take a variety of forms. Some regulations are aimed entirely at redistribution, such as when we tax the rich and give to the poor. Other regulations seek to counteract externalities by restricting behavior in a way that imposes harm on an individual basis but yields net societal benefits. A good example is taxation to fund public goods such as roads. In such situations, an individual would be better off if she alone were exempt from the tax; she benefits when everyone (including herself) must pay the tax.
Keywords
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
