Competitive Equilibrium with Middlemen: An Empirical Study
Southern Economic JournalPublished 1 April 1981
Charles R. Plott, Jonathan T. Uhl
Citations56
SJR quartileQ2
SJR score0.77
SNIP1.08
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Abstract
Public distrust of middlemen frequently occurs in market systems. Boycotts, regulations, and investigations of middlemen are not uncommon [3; 7]. This position of disfavor is somewhat paradoxical since application of economic theory suggests that competition among middlemen can be relied upon to protect consumers and producers. According to received doctrine any differences in purchase and resale prices would reflect the costs involved in market making. Nevertheless public suspicion remains.
Keywords
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
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