Feminist Epistemology as a Local Epistemology

Abstract

ntroductory remarks. The very idea of feminist epistemology throws some philosophers into near apoplexy. Partly this is social and psychological: an aversion to the revisionist challenges of feminism abetted by a healthy if residual misogyny. Partly this is intellectual: how could a politically and intellectually partial form of inquiry have anything to say about epistemology, which is or ought to be about very general questions concerning the nature of knowledge? The former is worth noting, but not discussing; the second, however, goes to the heart of what feminist epistemology is. This essay pursues one line of thought in feminist epistemology with a view to sorting out the relation between it and general epistemology, and between it and other approaches in feminist theory of knowledge. First I should note what feminist epistemology is not. It is not the study or defence of feminine intuition, of 'women's ways of knowing', of subjectivism; it is not an embrace of irrationality or of Protagorean relativism. Although feminist philosophers have celebrated the female subject, have argued for the constructive role of emotion in knowledge, and have criticized standard accounts of objectivity and rationality, attacks on feminist epistemology tend to ignore the arguments feminists offer and instead go after straw women. As they misrepresent the feminist work they purport to criticize, they do not deserve any kind of detailed response, but do impose on feminists a burden yet again to say what we mean. Also, contrary to the apparent view of many of its detractors, feminist epistemology encompasses a number of different directions of analysis some of which are, others of which are not, mutually compatible. In addition, themes and positions in feminist epistemology