Ontology and scientific explanation: Pluralism as an a priori condition of psychology

Abstract

The field of psychology can be understood in terms of general accounts of mental life that differ over time and between cultures or in terms of an academic discipline. For the former, pluralism is an a priori condition because history and culture produce necessarily and universally varying accounts of human subjectivity that are embedded in local practices and traditions. This argument is traced to the nature of psychological objects and events that are of a cultural–historical kind. For Psychology as an academic discipline it is argued that pluralism depends on varying ontological levels, ranging from natural to cultural–historical kinds. The same argument of varying levels applies to the concept of explanation. It is shown that important accounts in the discipline do not provide natural–scientific explanations but rather hermeneutic interpretations that afford high levels of pluralism. Based on the idea of a necessary and universal pluralism in the field of psychology, conditions for the possibility of integration are provided. It is argued that the first step of integration includes recognition of pluralistic accounts of mental life. Instead of assimilation, the accommodation of new ideas is recommended.