From Nash and Brown to Maynard Smith: Equilibria, Dynamics and ESS
SelectionPublished 1 January 2001Open access
Josef Hofbauer
Citations111
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Abstract
Nash™s three proofs for the existence of equilibria in strategic games correspond to three dynamics: The best re- sponse dynamics (equivalent to Brown™s fictitious play), the smoothed best response dynamics, and the Brown&von Neumann&Nash dynamics. We prove that an equilibrium which is evolutionarily stable as defined by Maynard Smith is (globally) asymptotically stable for each of these three dynamics.
Keywords
Social SciencesDecision SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
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