Pay-performance sensitivity and production uncertainty
Economics LettersPublished 1 December 1996Open access
Ján Zábojník
Citations51
SJR quartileQ2
SJR score0.76
SNIP0.98
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Abstract
The pay-performance sensitivity of linear incentive contracts can increase with increasing production uncertainty, depending upon the timing and nature of this uncertainty. This provides a possible explanation for the failure of empirical tests to yield convincing support for a negative relationship.
Keywords
Decision SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
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