Continuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development Revisited

Abstract

ABSTRACT This chapter is addressed to the question of existence of adulthood stages and stage change in moral development. Stage change is defined as directed, sequential, qualitative transformations in psychological structure. The existence of adulthood psychological stage change is theoretically important since such change must be the result of experiential interaction with the environment, rather than being linked to biological maturation. Evidence of Piagetian cognitive stages indicates continuing development of formal thought past adolescence but no new postadolescent cognitive stage. In contrast, this chapter indicates that there are moral stages that first appear in young adulthood (over 21) in a longitudinal sample. These are the stages of principled moral reasoning (Stage 5, social contract utilitarian orientation and Stage 6, universal principles of justice orientation). An earlier study by Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) reported attainment of principled moral reasoning in high school followed by “retrogression” to a skeptical egocentric relativism. A scoring system which better differentiates structure from content indicates that this skeptical relativism is a transitional state between conventional and principled morality rather than a retrogression. It also indicates that the high school reasoning scored as principled was only an advanced form of conventional reasoning (Stage 4, member of society orientation). It was suggested that the nature of the experiences leading to adulthood development, e.g., to principled moral thought, were somewhat different than those involved in childhood and adolescent movement to the conventional stages of moral reasoning. Development of moral thought in childhood is an increasingly adequate comprehension of existing social norms and social ideals. Accordingly, it develops through the usual experiences of social symbolic interaction and role taking. In contrast, construction of principles seems to require experiences of personal moral choice and responsibility usually supervening upon a questioning period of “moratorium.” This view of adulthood moral stages linked to experience of personal choice suggests a rapproachement between Erikson's stage theory of adult development and a more cognitive-structural stage theory. This, in turn, invites speculation as to a more ontological or religious seventh stage which might correspond to Erikson's stage of integrity–despair.