On the structure of fuzzy social welfare functions
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TL;DR
It is shown that all fuzzy aggregation rules which have non-narrow domains and which satisfy the fuzzy counterparts of independence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto criterion are characterized by a distribution of 'veto' power which would be generally considered undesirable.
Abstract
We investigate the structure of fuzzy aggregation rules which, for every permissible profile of individual preferences, specify a fuzzy social ordering. It is shown that all fuzzy aggregation rules which have non-narrow domains and which satisfy the fuzzy counterparts of independence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto criterion are characterized by a distribution of 'veto' power which would be generally considered undesirable.