Is Punishment Effective? Coercive Strategies in Social Exchange

Abstract

This research tests competing predictions about the effectiveness of coercive strategies in social exchange. Both the classical exchange theories and most bargaining theories argue that the actual use of punishment in exchange relations provokes hostility and retaliation, and leads to a decrease rather than an increase in mutually rewarding exchange. I argue instead that more frequent use of contingent punishment would increase the effectiveness of punishment power. Although the motivation to minimize loss constrains the use of punishment, that motivation should make it highly effective when used. An experiment tested these predictions, using computer-simulated actors who were programmed to employ varying levels of contingent punishment, under different structures of punishment power, against a partner with a reward power advantage. In support of my predictions, more frequent punishment for nonexchange increased the partner's reward exchange without increasing retaliation or negative affect. Punishment that was both strong and consistent produced the highest frequency of reward exchange and the least negative affect toward the partner.