Visualisation and Cognition: Drawing Things Together

Abstract

It would be nice to be able to define what is specific to our modem scientific culture. It would be still nicer to find the most economical explanation (which might not be the most economic one) of its origins and special characteristics. To arrive at a parsimonious explanation it is best not to appeal to universal traits of nature. Hypotheses about changes in the mind or human consciousness, in the structure of the brain, in social relations, in “mentalites”, or in the economic infrastructure which are posited to explain the emergence of science or its present achievements are simply too grandiose, not to say hagiographic in most cases and plainly racist in more than a few others. Occam’s razor should cut these explanations short. No “new man” suddenly emerged sometime in the sixteenth century, and there are no mutants with larger brains working inside modern !laboratories who can think differently from the rest of us. The idea that a more !rational mind or a more constraining scientific method emerged from darkness !and chaos is too complicated a hypothesis. It seems to me that the first step towards a convincing explanation is to adopt! this a priori position. It clears the field of study of any single distinction between ! prescientific and scientific cultures, minds, methods or societies. As Jack Goody !points out, the “grand dichotomy” with its self-righteous certainty should be !replaced by many uncertain and unexpected divides (Goody, 1977). This negative first move frees us from positive answers that strain credulity1. All such ! dichotomous distinctions can be convincing only as long as