The Legislator as Political Entrepreneur: Investment in Political Capital
The Review of Austrian EconomicsPublished 1 June 2002
Edward J. López
Citations37
SJR quartileQ2
SJR score0.41
SNIP0.54
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Abstract
This paper applies the standard Austrian theory of capital investment to the standard interest group model of legislator behavior. Distinguishing between reputational capital and representative capital as interdependent forms of political capital, I argue that legislator behavior (specifically roll call voting) can be explained as entrepreneurial investment in political capital under uncertainty. I discuss several examples in which this approach can potentially add predictive power regarding legislative voting.
Keywords
Social SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and FinanceBusiness, Management and Accounting
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