The Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks
Published 20 October 2005Open access
H. Peyton Young
Citations169
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TL;DR
The long-run dynamics of processes in which new technologies and forms of behavior are transmitted through social and geographic networks are characterized in terms of the geometry of the network but without placing a priori restrictions on the network structure.
Abstract
Abstract This chapter examines the effects of network topology on the diffusion of behaviors. A key empirical question is, what is the expected length of time for a network to “switch over” from the old behavior to the new? It uncovers conditions on network topology the decision process that, surprisingly, bound the expected waiting time for diffusion to occur from above, independently of the size of the network.
Keywords
Decision SciencesPhysics and Astronomy
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