Complements, mollifiers and the propensity to disrupt
International Journal of Game TheoryPublished 1 March 1978
A. Charnes, John J. Rousseau, L. Seiford
Citations41
SJR quartileQ2
SJR score0.34
SNIP0.69
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Abstract
Gately [1974] andLittlechild/Vaidya [1976] defined and studied ratio measures of “disruption propensity” of coalitions in ann-person game. We define and study new incremental measures giving rise to a wide variety of “disruption solution” concepts free of various ratio defects and affording advantages of analysis and acceptability in terms of solution specifications. Various “mollifier” and “homomollifier” solution concepts are characterized which appear to be of promising utility.
Keywords
Decision SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
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