Uncovering Metaethical Assumptions in Bioethical Discourse across Cultures

This paper analyzes two representative positions in the discussion of informed consent in East Asia and suggests that the metaethical assumptions of these positions result from their shared method of ethical justification: moral principlism.

Abstract

Much of bioethical discourse now takes place across cultures. This does not mean that cross-cultural understanding has increased. Many cross-cultural bioethical discussions are marked by entrenched disagreement about whether and why local practices are justified. In this paper, I argue that a major reason for these entrenched disagreements is that problematic metaethical commitments are hidden in these cross-cultural discourses. Using the issue of informed consent in East Asia as an example of one such discourse, I analyze two representative positions in the discussion and identify their metaethical commitments. I suggest that the metaethical assumptions of these positions result from their shared method of ethical justification: moral principlism. I then show why moral principlism is problematic in cross-cultural analyses and propose a more useful method for pursuing ethical justification across cultures.