login

Status and incentives

The RAND Journal of EconomicsPublished 1 March 2008Open access
Emmanuelle Auriol, Régis Renault
Citations109
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score4.17
SNIP2.43
View PDF

Abstract

This article introduces status as reflecting an agent's claim to recognition in her work. This is a scarce resource: increasing an agent's status requires that another agent's status be decreased. Higher‐status agents are more willing to exert effort in exchange for money; better‐paid agents would exert higher effort in exchange for improved status. The results are consistent with actual management practices: (i) egalitarianism is desirable in a static context; (ii) in a long‐term work relationship, juniors' compensation is delayed; and (iii) past performance is rewarded by pay increases along with improved status within the organization's hierarchy.

Keywords

Social SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and Finance