The Fallacy of the Private‐Public Self‐Focus Distinction

Abstract

ABSTRACT Taking the distinction between Aristotelian and Galilean modes of thought (Lewin, 1931) as a background, the bifurcation of the self‐focus concept into “private” and “public” types of self‐focus is discussed critically A theoretical connection between the private‐public distinction and other central concepts within the self‐awareness literature is found to be lacking Further, it is found that ( a ) the relation between the theoretical definitions of “private” and “public” and their respective empirical definitions is not explicated, that ( b ) the public half of the dichotomy does not involve a focus of attention toward or away from the self, and perhaps most important, that ( c ) the conceptual work surrounding the private‐public distinction illustrates how an Aristotelian approach to theorizing prevents the raising of pertinent questions