On the Limits of Communication in Multidimensional Cheap Talk: A Comment
EconometricaPublished 1 May 2007
Gilat Levy, Ronny Razin
Citations84
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score21.09
SNIP5.31
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Abstract
We analyze a cheap talk game, à la Crawford and Sobel, in a multidimensional state and policy space. A feature of the multidimensional state space is that communication on one dimension often reveals information on others. We show how this feature imposes bounds on communication. Copyright The Econometric Society 2007.
Keywords
Decision SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
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