STAKEHOLDER‐AGENCY THEORY
Journal of Management StudiesPublished 1 March 1992
Charles W. L. Hill, Thomas M. Jones
Citations2,439
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score5.46
SNIP3.87
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Abstract
ABSTRACT Taking agency theory and stakeholder theory as points of departure, this article proposes a paradigm that helps explain the following: (1) certain aspects of a firm's strategic behaviour; (2) the structure of management‐stakeholder contracts; (3) the form taken by the institutional structures that monitor and enforce contracts between managers and other stakeholders; and (4) the evolutionary process that shapes both management‐stakeholder contracts and the institutional structures that police those contracts.
Keywords
Economics, Econometrics and FinanceBusiness, Management and Accounting
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