Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Academy of Management ReviewPublished 1 January 1989
Kathleen M. Eisenhardt
Citations9,379
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score14.40
SNIP6.11
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Abstract
Agency theory is an important, yet controversial, theory. This paper reviews agency theory, its contributions to organization theory, and the extant empirical work and develops testable propositions. The conclusions are that agency theory (a) offers unique insight into information systems, outcome uncertainty, incentives, and risk and (b) is an empirically valid perspective, particularly when coupled with complementary perspectives. The principal recommendation is to incorporate an agency perspective in studies of the many problems having a cooperative structure.
Keywords
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