The effects of prenegotiation expectations on the distributive bargaining process

Abstract

The level of aspiration and minimum necessary share values of negotiators were manipulated prior to bargaining sessions in a simulated bilateral monopoly. Derivations from the theory of Kelley, Beckman, and Fischer were generally supported for low level of aspiration negotiators: subjects with high minimum necessary share values had higher mean levels of demand and received more points in the settlements than subjects with low minimum necessary share values. For high level of aspiration negotiators the effects were in the opposite direction; a tentative interpretation of the latter results was presented. In general, negotiators with high levels of aspiration had higher initial demands, higher mean levels of demand and received more points in the settlements than negotiators with low levels of aspiration. These findings support Siegel and Fouraker's model. However, on closer analysis the effects of level of aspiration were limited to negotiators with low minimum necessary share values.