Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment
Cambridge University Press eBooksPublished 5 May 2008
Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman
Citations376
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Abstract
Uncertainty is an unavoidable aspect of the human condition. Many significant choices must be based on beliefs about the likelihood of such uncertain events as the guilt of a defendant, the result of an election, the future value of the dollar, the outcome of a medical operation, or the response of a friend. Because we normally do not have adequate formal models for computing the probabilities of such events, intuitive judgment is often the only practical method for assessing uncertainty.
Keywords
Computer ScienceDecision SciencesArts and Humanities
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