THE ROLE OF POWER AND POLITICS IN THE REPRICING OF EXECUTIVE OPTIONS.
Academy of Management JournalPublished 1 December 2002Open access
Timothy G. Pollock, H. M. Fischer, Jaleesa Wade
Citations175
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score10.53
SNIP3.95
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Abstract
We explore how CEO power affects the repricing of executive options. The spread between an option's exercise, or strike, price, and the market value of a stock impacts the likelihood of repricing. This effect is enhanced when the CEO of the firm in question is also the chairman of its board. Firm and CEO visibility, more board members appointed after a CEO's hiring than before it, a staggered board, and relatively high percentages of CEO and institutional ownership reduce the impact of the spread on the likelihood of repricing.
Keywords
Economics, Econometrics and FinanceBusiness, Management and Accounting
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