Happiness Donut: A Confucian Critique of Positive Psychology.

Abstract

An empirically based version of the good life as proposed by positive psychology is a donut with something missing at the core—the moral map. This paper addresses ramifications of this lacuna, and suggests ways to narrow the gap between science and life. By applying an extended version of the self-regulation theory of Higgins to a cross cultural analysis of the good life as envisioned by Seligman and Confucius, respectively, this paper sheds light on the culturally encapsulated value judgments behind positive psychology, examines issues at stake in an empirically based version of the good life, and suggests, for future research, alternative approaches that may better fulfill the promises of positive psychology. HAPPINESS DONUT: A CONFUCIAN CRITIQUE OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY Positive psychology has two versions, strong and weak. The weak version claims that we can benefit from studying the so far neglected “positive” attributes of life. Except for its overly simplistic polarization of the positive and the negative (see Solomon & Stone, 2002), this claim is rather innocuous. But at the same time it cannot be taken seriously as an innovation in science. If the whole thing is a matter of shuffling research agendas, then the pendulum is bound to swing back to the negative, when in the foreseeable future the positive side of the coin has generated silos of data. The strong version of positive psychology is more interesting, as it goes beyond another round of the pendulum. The strong version of positive psychology is best expressed by Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi in their definitive statement of the movement (2000), in which they urged “social and behavioral sciences” to “articulate a vision of the good life that is empirically sound” (p. 5). This claim is bold and innovative, but problematic. To the extent that * Thanks are due James R. Averill for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. \\server05\productn\T\THE\25-1\THE104.txt unknown Seq: 2 12-OCT-05 12:04 36 Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psy. Vol. 25, No. 1, 2005 the problems inherent in the strong version of positive psychology are emblematic of psychology as a science, a critique of positive psychology will be worthwhile. Aiming at the wider implications for psychology in general, this paper does not intend to provide an exhaustive literature review, but will give instead a general outline of issues at stake in the positive psychology’s vision of the good life. What is the good life? In his book Authentic Happiness (2002), Seligman answers this question by postulating three flavors of happiness—the pleasant life, characterized by positive emotions; the good life, characterized by gratification from the practice of one’s “signature strength”; and the meaningful life, characterized by serving goals and purposes that transcend those of the individual self. He is emphatic about the fact that his model implies no hierarchies: “It does not . . . as a theory, value any one of these lives above the others” (p. 303, note 249). It is along the same line of scientific “neutrality” that Seligman poses the following question: Imagine a sadomasochist who comes to savor serial killing and derives great pleasure from it. Imagine a hit man who derives enormous gratification from stalking and slaying. Imagine a terrorist who, attached to al-Qaeda, flies a hijacked plane into the World Trade Center. Can these three people be said to have achieved the pleasant life, the good life, and the meaningful life, respectively? (p. 303, note 249) And he answers his own question in the affirmative: “The answer is yes. I condemn their actions, of course, but on grounds independent of the theory in this book” (p. 303, note 249). By excising the value question for the sake of “scientific neutrality,” Seligman has given us a model of the good life devoid of a moral map. This seriously undermines the credibility of his model, for it is questionable whether any form of life that is considered “good”—the “good life” broadly defined to include all three versions of happiness— can be devoid of a moral map. The problem with the neutrality claim does not stop here, however. There is an inherent contradiction in Seligman’s version of the good life: it fails to articulate a moral map on the one hand; and it is not free from value judgments, on the other. Anchored in but not confined to the Confucian tradition, my critique consists of three parts: Part I examines the nature of moral maps, and shows how the neutrality claim is tantamount to a failure on the part of the scientists to make explicit their own value assumptions; part II gives close reading of a text that is paradigmatic of the strong version of positive psychology—Seligman’s book Authentic Happiness. My analysis of this book consists of two strategies: a. citing counter examples from Confucian texts, primarily the Analects, to show an alternative vision of the good life; and b. using psychological theories and \\server05\productn\T\THE\25-1\THE104.txt unknown Seq: 3 12-OCT-05 12:04