Justice-based opposition to social policies: Is it genuine?

Abstract

Three studies examined whether the concern for justice can be a genuine determinant ofattitudes toward affirmative action (AA) or whether justice-based opposition merely masks prejudice. In line with the hypothesis of justice as a cause, we found that, independent of their level of prejudice, people were opposed to AA programs that violate distributive and procedural justice norms, as a result of genuine beliefs in the principles of fairness that the programs violate. Nevertheless, in line with the hypothesis of justice as a rationalization, we also found that people's prejudice level was positively associated with opposition to AA programs that were not explicitly justice violating; moreover, the effect of prejudice was mediated through the tendency to construe these programs as justice violating. The present research has implications for understanding attitudes toward social policies where it is possible that justice concerns could be a genuine source of opposition or a rationalization of prejudice. In recent years, the societal debate about policies on such issues as immigration, affirmative action (AA) , or bilingualism has become increasingly polarized. Consider the case of AA: On the one hand, many opponents claim that AA is unfair, because such policies consider people's membership in particu-