DISAGGREGATING THE AGENCY CONTRACT: THE EFFECTS OF MONITORING, INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT, AND TERM IN OFFICE ON AGENT DECISION MAKING.
Academy of Management JournalPublished 1 June 1997
Henry L. Tosi, J. P. KATZ, Luis R. Gómez‐Mejía
Citations340
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score10.53
SNIP3.95
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Abstract
Using a laboratory design, we examined the simple and interactive effects of monitoring and incentive alignment on managerial decisions. Length of term in office was a third independent variable. R...
Keywords
Business, Management and Accounting
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